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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
BLAKE D. PETERSON, 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
Case No. 981675-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1998). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the trial court erred in determining that reasonable suspicion existed to 
execute a level two stop and detention of Peterson? "A trial court's determination of 
reasonable articulable suspicion is a conclusion of law reviewed for correctness.... 
Appellate courts, however, afford the trial judge 'a measure of discretion' in applying 
the reasonable articulable suspicion standard to a particular set of facts." State v. 
Humphrey. 937 P.2d 137, 140 (Utah App. 1997) (citations omitted). 
1 
This issue was preserved in a pre-trial Motion to Suppress (R. 47-58, 103-06). 
2. Whether the stop and detention of Peterson were justified pursuant to the 
"community caretaker functions" of law enforcement personnel? This Court should 
review the trial court's findings of fact for "clear error" and the trial court's legal 
conclusions for "correctness." Provo City v. Warden, 844 P.2d 360, 362 (Utah App. 
1992) (citations omitted). 
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
United States Constitution, Amendment IV 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, 
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to 
be seized. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Blake Peterson appeals from the judgment, sentence and commitment imposed 
by the Honorable Ray M. Harding after the denial of his motion to suppress evidence 
and the entrance of a conditional plea to Possession of a Controlled Substance, a third 
degree felony. 
B. Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition 
2 
On May 10, 1996, Peterson was charged by information with Possession of 
Methamphetamine, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Annotated Section 
SS^-S^XaXi).1 On September 20, 1996, a preliminary hearing was conducted and 
after a finding of probable cause, Peterson was subsequentiy arraigned on the charges 
(R. 21, 147). 
On January 21, 1997, Peterson filed with the trial court a motion to suppress 
evidence under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution on the grounds 
that he had been illegally seized and searched (R. 47-58). The trial court by signed 
memorandum decision issued on February 28, 1997, denied Peterson's motion (R. 108-
112). 
On March 5, 1997, Peterson entered a plea to Possession of Methamphetamine, 
a third degree felony, conditioned upon his right to appeal the trial court's denial of his 
motion to suppress (R. 113-118, 121-124). On September 18, 1998, Peterson was 
sentened to three years probation (R. 138-40). On October 16, 1998, Peterson filed a 
Notice of Appeal with the Fourth District Court and this action commenced (R. 142). 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
*Peterson was also charged with three misdemeanors which were subsequendy 
dismissed pursuant to a plea agreement. 
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Ai approximately 4:00 p.m. on April 19, 1996, Deputies Harold Curtis and 
David Knowles of the Utah County Sheriffs Department were patrolling the area of 
Archery Road near Squaw Peak in separate vehicles (Tr. at 4, 5). Shordy thereafter, 
the officers received a call from dispatch regarding a person known to frequent the 
Squaw Peak area who might be "suicidal" and driving a blue Ford Tempo (Tr. at 5, 
14). 
The officers began to ascend Squaw Peak via Archery Road. On the first pull 
out to the east of Archery Road, Knowles spotted a blue Dodge (Tr. at 5, 15). 
Knowles then radioed Curtis who was directly behind him and the two vehicles pulled 
into the pull-out (Tr. at 5-6). Peterson was seated in the driver's seat of the blue 
vehicle (Tr. at 12); and several other people were visible within the vehicle (Tr. at 7, 
11-12). 
Knowles testified that as he was pulling behind the vehicle and "making a stop", 
he observed Peterson "making furtive movements" with his left hand at the bottom of 
his seat and then Peterson exited the vehicle and threw a metallic object into a wooded 
area (Tr. at 6, 16). Knowles testified that when he pulled behind the Dodge, his 
vehicle blocked the only exit (Tr. at 16, 26). 
Curtis also observed the thrown object (Tr. at 7). Curtis then got out of his 
vehicle, hand-cuffed Peterson, and then searched the wooded area for the thrown object 
while Knowles approaced the Dodge (Tr. at 7, 17). Curtis subsequently located a 
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warm marijuana pipe (Tr. at 7). Knowles also testified that "at [this] point we were 
uncertain if the vehicle that we had was the suspect vehicle" but that the vehicle's 
occupants "were acting suspicious, making furtive movements" (Tr. at 10). 
After approaching the vehicle, Knowles asked the individuals inside the vehicle 
to place their hands where he could see them (Tr. at 10). Knowles testified that when 
the occupants raised their arms, Knowles observed an open container in the rear of the 
vehicle between the passenger seats (Id.). Knowles then had the occupants exit the 
vehicle and as he removed the open container he smelled a strong odor of marijuana in 
the vehicle (Id.). Knowles then searched the vehicle without the consent of the 
occupants and found zig-zag rolling papers and a rectangular piece of paper containing 
methamphetamine in the driver's side door (Tr. at 10-11, 20). Peterson later told the 
officers that the vehicle belonged to his parents (Tr. at 21). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Peterson asserts that the deputies from the Utah County Sheriffs Office lacked 
reasonable suspicion to justify the level two stop and detention executed in this case. 
Peterson argues further that the illegality of the stop cannot be overcome under a 
"community caretaker" standard. Accordingly, the evidence obtained from the 
detention of Peterson and the search of his vehicle should have been suppressed. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT REASONABLE 
ARTICULABLE SUSPICION EXISTED TO JUSTIFY THE LEVEL 
TWO STOP AND DETENTION OF PETERSON 
Utah courts have acknowledged three categories of constitutionally permissible 
encounters between citizens and law enforcement personnel: 
(1) An officer may approach a citizen at anytime [sic] and pose questions 
so long as the citizen is not detained against his will; (2) an officer may 
seize a person if the officer has an 'articulable suspicion' that the person 
has committed or is about to commit a crime; however, the 'detention 
must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the 
purpose of the stop'; (3) an officer may arrest a suspect if the officer has 
probable cause to believe an offense has been committed or is being 
committed." 
State v. Smith, 781 P.2d 879, 881 (Utah App. 1989) (citations omitted) (emphasis 
added). The distinction between a level one and level two encounter is whether if, "in 
view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would 
have believed that he was not free to leave" State v. Struhs. 940 P.2d 1225, 1227 (Utah 
App. 1997) (quoting United States v. MendenhalL 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980). 
In this case the trial court concluded that the encounter between Peterson and the 
officers became a level two stop "at some point" (R. 111). However, the trial court 
concluded that the officers' detention of Peterson was justified by "reasonable suspicion 
of criminal activity" (R. 110). 
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In regards to the level of suspicion necessary to effectuate a level two stop and 
detention 
a police officer must "point to specific and articulable facts which, together with 
rational inferences drawn from those facts, would lead a reasonable person to 
conclude [the defendant] had committed or was about to commit a crime." The 
assessment of whether reasonable suspicion exists is an objective standard based 
on the totality of the circumstances. . ." 
Struhs, 940 P.2d at 1228 (Utah App. 1997) (quoting State v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85, 88-
89) (emphases added). The trial court concluded that Peterson's "furtive movement" 
of reaching under his seat "coupled with the attempt to conceal the metallic object by 
throwing it into the woods" created a reasonable, articulate suspicion of criminal 
activity under the totality of circumstances which authorized the deputies to further 
detain Peterson and the other occupants for subsequent investigation (R. 110). 
However, Peterson asserts that the deputies under the totality of circumstances 
could not point to "specific and articulable facts" which would lead a reasonable person 
to believe, that Peterson or the other occupants had committed—or were about to 
commit—a crime. First and foremost, the deputies, stopped the wrong vehicle. The 
information received by the deputies from dispatch concerned a blue Ford Tempo (Tr. 
at 5, 14). However, the vehicle driven by Peterson was a blue Dodge (Tr. at 5, 15). 
Second, the information received by dispatch concerned a suicidal "individual" while 
Peterson was with at least three other individuals (Tr. at 7, 11-12). The road which 
leads up to Squaw Peak is narrow and windy, and it is bordered by numerous pull outs 
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which are themselves practically invisible until a driver is almost completely beside 
one. At the point in which the officers saw Peterson's vehicle, they must have been 
close enough to realize that they had the wrong type of car and, quite simply, the 
wrong number of suspects. 
The trial court in reaching his conclusion of "reasonable suspicion" ignored 
these facts and focused only upon Peterson's solitary "furtive movement" and his 
throwing an object into the woods. A furtive movement by itself is insufficient to 
establish reasonable suspicion. See, State v. Holmes. 774 P.2d 506, 511 (Utah App. 
1989). Moreover, Peterson could have been doing any number of things when he 
made the alleged "furtive movement"—retrieving car keys from the floor boards, tying 
his shoes, reaching for his wallet, etc.; and he could have been throwing any number of 
items into the woods. 
Accordingly, Peterson requests, in light of the true totality of circumstances 
surrounding the encounter between the deputies and the vehicle occupants, that this 
Court "correct" the trial court's conclusion of "reasonable suspicion" and hold that the 
evidence obtained as a result of the unconstitutional detention of Peterson and the 
subsequent search of his vehicle must be suppressed. 
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POINT n 
THE ILLEGAL DETENTION OF PETERSON CANNOT 
BE JUSTIFIED UNDER A "COMMUNITY CARETAKER" STANDARD 
The trial court concluded in the alternative that the stop and detention of 
Peterson was justified under a "community caretaker" function of law enforcement 
personnel. 
In Provo City v. Warden. 844 P.2d 360 (Ut. App. 1992), the Utah Court of 
Appeals outiined a three-pronged test whereby courts may analyze the legitimacy of 
"community caretaker" stops. In Warden, a tip to a police officer revealed that an 
individual in the vicinity was intending to overdose on cocaine. The officer was 
supplied with a full description of the vehicle and the license plate number, together 
with information regarding the approximate location of the car. The officer located a 
car with a matching description and plate number and pulled the driver over. This stop 
was effectuated, however, with no evidence that a crime was being, or was about to be, 
committed; nor was there a reasonable suspicion that such activity was afoot. After 
making the stop, the officer could smell alcohol on the defendant's breath. After field 
tests revealed that defendant was intoxicated, he was charged and convicted of driving 
under the influence. Id. at 361. 
The defendant appealed the conviction, arguing that the stop amounted to an 
illegal seizure and the evidence used against him should be suppressed. The Court of 
Appeals affirmed his conviction, holding that the officer conducted a valid community 
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caretaker stop which was not violative of the fourth amendment. The Warden court 
applied the following test to the facts when reviewing the trial court: 
First, did a seizure occur under the Fourth Amendment definition of that 
term? Second, based upon an objective analysis, was the seizure in 
pursuit of a bona fide caretaker function — under the given 
circumstances, would a reasonable officer have stopped a vehicle for a 
purpose consistent with community caretaker functions? Third, based 
upon an objective analysis, did the circumstances demonstrate an 
imminent danger to life or limb. 
Id. At 364 (emphasis added). 
Peterson asserts that an application of the Warden test cannot support the stop in 
the case at bar. Appellant submits that, although the first and third prongs are met, the 
stop at Squaw Peak fails the test under the second prong, as a reasonable officer under 
the given circumstances would not have stopped Peterson's vehicle. For mainly the 
reasons stated above, the deputies should have known from the outset that they were 
investigating the wrong car and the wrong people. The incident occurred at 
approximately 4:00 p.m. in April, so there was certainly enough light for the deputies 
to realize that they had not yet found a blue Dodge carrying a lone, suicidal individual. 
These points emphasize an important factual distinction from Warden, where the seized 
car matched not only the description but also the license plate number of the suspect 
vehicle. 
Peterson submits that a reasonable officer confronted with the facts of the case at 
bar would not have detained his vehicle. Therefore, the stop cannot be justified under 
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the community caretaker rule as oudined in Warden. Accordingly, Peterson asks that 
this Court hold that the "community caretaker" standard cannot cure the illegal 
detention of Peterson and unconstitutional search of his vehicle. 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
Peterson asks this Court to reverse the trial court's denial of his motion to 
suppress and to remand the case to the Fourth District Court with instructions that his 
plea may be withdrawn and that the evidence should be suppressed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this # 1 day of April, 1999. 
Margaret P. Lindsay y r
Counsel for Peterson 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I delliered two (2) true and correct copies of the foregoing 
Brief to the Utah Attorney General, Appeals Division, 160 E. 300 South, 6th Floor, 
P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 this^Y day of April, 1999. 
^ / ^ i ^ X 
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F5L.EO 
Fourth Judicial District Court 
of Ut,--.h_Ccurity. Staiu oJ Utah 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
vs. 
BLAKE PETERSON, 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND 
ORDER 
C A S E !"' " M IIKJ/J.II 
DATF .-ebruary 28, H>97 
J i IHTL RAY M. HARDING 
) \ \\ CLERK: Christine Gerhart 
DEPUTY CLERK: Georgia Snyder 
I his i i lat I: 5 1: came befoi e the C :>i 11 1: 1  ip c 1 1 Defendai it's I""1 lotion to Suppress . Hav ing 
received and considered the Mot ion , together with m e m o r a n d a in support of and opposi t ion to 
the Motion, the Court hereby denies the Motion and delivers the following Memorandum 
Decision. 
Statemc nit c f F acts 
at approximately 4:00pm, Deputies Harold Curtis and David 
Knowles of the Utah County Sheriffs Office received a report of a suicidal person, possibly 
armed with a gun, driving a blue Ford Tempo who may be in the Squaw Peak area. As 
Deputies Curtis and Knowles drove up Archery Road looking for the vehicle, they spotted a 
blue vehicle parked ; off of the road. 
II! I I 1 I 1 I I I I I I III Hi I I I , III I I I  I III II II I III III II ILS V V t t S t i l l * 
..;-.. - ^ ^ looking 10: \ t;c pui . . .,,) behind the blue car, he saw the Defendant get 
• >.,: o! the car and throw a shiny, metallic object into the woods. Deputy Curtis, pulling in 
behind Deputy Knowles also saw the occupant of the car throw the object, then saw the other 
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occupants begin to exit the car. He ordered them back into the vehicle, then approached the 
vehicle and asked the Defendant what he had thrown into the woods. The Defendant denied 
throwing anything, so Deputy Curtis went to search in the area he had seen the object thrown 
while Deputy Knowles approached the car to secure the rest of the occupants while the 
Deputies were conducting their investigation. 
Deputy Knowles observed an open container of beer in the car and ordered the 
occupants out of the car. As he was retrieving the open container of beer, he noticed the 
smell of marijuana inside the car. Deputy Knowles searched the car and found 
methamphetamine folded inside a "Camel Buck" along with zig zag papers inside the driver's 
side door pocket. Deputy Curtis located a marijuana pipe from the area where he saw the 
Defendant throw the object. The pipe was still warm, was not wet or covered with dirt, and 
had marijuana residue inside the bowl. 
Opinion of the Court 
I. THE DEPUTIES HAD A REASONABLE, ARTICULABLE SUSPICION TO 
EXECUTE A LEVEL TWO STOP AND TEMPORARILY DETAIN THE 
DEFENDANT. 
The Defendant argues that when Deputy Knowles pulled in and blocked the exit 
with his vehicle that at that point the Defendant was seized and entitled to Fourth Amendment 
protections. The Defendant relies on State v. Smith 781 P.2d 879 (Utah App. 1989) to claim 
that a level two stop occurred without a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity 
and that the facts in this case are entirely distinguishable from those in State v. Jackson 805 
P.2d 765 (Utah App. 1990), where the court found a seizure had not occurred. 
The Court agrees that at some point, a level two stop of the Defendant occurred and 
he was seized. The Court disagrees with the Defendant, however, as to when the stop 
occurred. The facts in this case seem to fall somewhere in between Smith and Jackson. 
Deputy Knowles testified that as he was pulling in behind the Defendant's vehicle, stopping 
2 
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his vehicle and calling in the stop, he saw the Defendant reach underneath his seat, exit the 
car and throv A ni.;+uj » ( i c ; into the woo^ N <Preliminary H-anng Irai.^ii, ;. i.^ci.uJur 
"PHI .. „. • • u *-• - Smmi did,* h<n\e\e: tin Defendant 
did not approach Deputy Knowles and initiate the contact as the defendant in Jackson did. 
The Defendant clearly did notJfeeLiom^ the mere presence of the deputy's 
vehicle behind him, since he got out and threw something into the woods. It was only after 
he had thrown the object that his freedomjvas restrained.jgjhe deputies. 
The Defendant's car was already stopped in the pull-out when th 
approached and he > a s clearl> fi ee to move around, similar to the defendant in Jackson, , . ' a* 
768. The Defendant did not voluntarily approach the deputies and initiate the contact, but 
that is only because before he could do so, he threw the pipe into the woods, an act which 
created a reasonable suspicion in the deputies' minds of criminal activity. 
The furtive movements alone of the Defendant do not provide a reasonable 
suspicion of criminal activity. However, when viewed in the totality of the circumstances,jtlie^ 
furtive movements coupled with the attempt to conceal the metallic object by thi^wngj^into 
the woods does create a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity authorizing the 
deputies to temporarily detain the Defendant while they investigated. Since these actions 
occurred prior to, or contemporaneously with Deputy Knowles blocking the exit to the pull-
out with his vehicle, jhe CoyrJLjfindsjthat^^ the Defendant was 
appropriate. Once the deputie had looat \i the marijuana pipe in the woods, in addition to 
viewing the open c r+ - * - <. \enicit* * *.-•. iiaa ieasonable suspicion sufficient 
to justify searching the car without a warrant. 
THE STOP IS JUSTIFIED IN THE ALTERNATIVE AS A COMMUNITY 
CARETAKER STOP. 
0110 
The Deputies's original purpose in pulling in behind the Defendant's vehicle was to 
ascertain whether or not this was the vehicle possibly containing the suicidal individual. 
From the roadway, Deputy Knowles saw the vehicle in the pullout was a blue sedan. He 
pulled into the pull-out, behind the Defendant's car to investigate whether or not this was, in 
fact, the blue Ford Tempo he was looking for. 
The Defendant does not take issue with the first and third factors of the community 
caretaker stop test as defined in Provo City v. Warden. 844 P.2d 360, 364 (Utah App. 1992). 
However, the Defendant claims that the second factor, whether the police conduct was bona 
fide community caretaker activity, has not been met. The Defendant bases his argument on 
the fact that the car the deputies were looking for was a blue Ford Tempo, whereas his car is 
a blue Dodge. 
The Court finds the Defendant's argument unpersuasive. The area the deputies were 
searching is heavily wooded and the Defendant's car was parked off of the main road on a 
side road or "pull-out" which leads to a camping spot. Deputy Knowles testified that from 
the main road all that he could see was that a blue passenger car was parked in the pull-out. 
Because of the physical circumstances, he was not able to ascertain whether the car was a 
Ford Tempo or not. His sole purpose in pulling in behind the Defendant's vehicle was to 
determine the make and model of the car to see if it matched his description. Before he 
could pull close enough behind the vehicle to make that determination, the Defendant pulled 
something from underneath the seat, exited the vehicle and threw it into the woods. 
The Court finds that Deputy's Knowles and Curtis were acting in a reasonable 
manner when they pulled in behind the Defendant's vehicle. It is ludicrous to expect the 
deputies to make a determination of whether or not this was the vehicle they were looking for 
without pulling off of the main road and inspecting the blue vehicle they had spotted from the 
road. Indeed, it would be unreasonable for them, suspecting that someone's life was in 
imminent danger not to investigate. It is unclear from the record how specific the description 
4 
of the vehicle they were looking for was, but it is evident to the Court that the Defendant's 
vehicle has enough similar characteristics to lead the deputies to pull in behind the 
Defendant's vehicle and investigate. Indeed the Court finds that the deputies, as the officer in 
Warden we;».» n v ; ... • •;:: .:, LM.M^r A UI, \ . acquisiti- :311c f 
evidence •'>!:»•'' 1^  •>-* ronini! . 1 -• * - ; .*;• : i .^ ob oJ the suspicious activities 
of the Defendant Id. at 365 Iherefbre, me Court finds that the second prong of the test was 
met and the Defendant was seized pursuant to a reasonable community caretaker stop. 
Order 
The Defendant's 1:;. :...:. . .. 
IIA IFI) •* • -
BY THE COURT: 
cc: Utah County Attorney 
Utah County Public Defender 
. HARDING, Jl^Xffi 
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Aiv. L'iSTP.ICT CuURT o: 
STMT. <?- UTAH ' '/f 
UTA - ::-.,'^ 'Y ^ 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
U T A H C O ^ T E ^ , qa^jA^E!9(pF U T A H 
S T A T E v,x U T A H , 
v s 
I P IK IK II 
P1 a 1111 i f f , 
Defendant• 
: ase No. 9 614 0 0720 
Preliminary Hearing 
utronically recorded 
September 20, 1996 
BEFORE: THE HONORABLE RAY M. HARDING, SR. 
Fourth Judicial District Court Judge 
APPEARANCES: 
For the State: CLAUDIA LAYCOCK 
Utah County Attorney 
100 East Center Street 
Suite 2100 
Provo Utah 8 4 606 
l''ur t he Defendant: MICHAEL JEWELL 
Utah County Public Defender 
40 South 100 West 
Suite 200 
P rovo, 1J t a h 8 4 6 01 
Transcribed by: Beverly Lowe RPR/CSR/CCT 
CENTER COURT REPORTING 
P 0. BOX 17 8 6 
PROVO, UTAH 84603-1786 
TELEPHONE: ( 8 0 1 ) 2 2 4 - 9 8 4 7 
FftED 
FEB 
•)&> i ~}^ Y ^ 
COURT C APPEALS V± 
2 
INDEX 
WITNESS: DAVID KNOWLES PAGE 
DIRECT EXAMINATION BY: MS. LAYCOCK 4 
CROSS EXAMINATION BY: MR. JEWELL 13 
REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY: MS. LAYCOCK 2 6 
-oOo-
EXHIBITS 
NUMBER DESCRIPTION RECEIVED 
No. 1 Bag with Marijuana Pipe 9 
-oOo-
II^J^J'J _C_JJ! K U . I N G S 
I I I'-'uLi u m c a l l y r e c o r d e d S e p t e m b e r ~ ~ " ~ ~ r ) 
THE COURT: Okay, li State versus Peterson 
3 : 
, . MR, JEWELL: Oh I th i nk that might be 
j$&m Laycock ' 7 case, j c xz " : r: : 2 • 
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Let me see I£ ~ 
find h^ r. 
T u ready on. this one, 
Ms. Laycock? 
MS. LAYCOCK: We 
THE COURT: Okay, you may proceed. Call 
your first witness. 
Thank you, your Honor. We'd 
call Deputy Knowles. 
know 
••-he Pt^te i;o^  another witness. t tit-
would invoke the exclusionat 
rr%r%r.r 4- K ^ +- matters. 
MS, LAYCOCK: Ari f a r iv; 1 k n o w w« a u n - u . 
' mi ill III i ) J 1 1 , " 
THE COURT: Okay. Do you want raise 
your right hand. I I t !,,,• 
,-,il li . . . , ,, 
COURT CLERK: You Ju Lulemnly swear the 
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testimony you shall give in this case now pending 
before the Court will be the truth, the whole truth 
and nothing but the truth, so help you God? 
please. 
BY MS. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
4/19/96 
A. 
Q. 
patroll 
A. 
THE WITNESS: I do. 
THE COURT: Be seated now in this chair, 
DAVID KNOWLES, 
having been first duly sworn, 
testified as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
LAYCOCK: 
Would you state your name. 
David Knowles. 
And with whom are you employed? 
Utah County Sheriff's Department. 
And what do you do in that employment? 
I'm a patrol deputy. 
All right, and were you on patrol on 
? 
Yes. 
About 4 in the afternoon where were you 
ing? 
I was patrolling in the area of Squaw 
Peak, near Archery R^ad. 
Q. Okay, and is that in Utah County? 
1 A. I 
2 Q* And did you ever receive? 
dispatch regardina ^articular c< 
• 5 • • . A • Yes « w "ij r e c e i v e d a i i r • t h a t t h e r e w a s a 
I ,11 'H ! 11,11 dill .'ill I,, I l l L i ill V I mi,J L i f" I 1 I 1 1 if I 1 I "1 I I 1 fci t J U G 1 I I I I J < 
Squaw Peak area. He was supposedly driving a blue 
8 v eh i c 1 e a nd I d o) in i \\ .1' 1 i". 1; i 
9 Deputy Curtis anc responded In I, lu-i area to check 
10 Lu see if he might : up inert'. 
11 C . Were nn am Deputy Curtis {™ 
12 separate vehicles? 
13 A e. 
14 Q right, and when you responded I that 
15 area what did you find? 
rt
 Archery Road *~ ve were 
coming up on the firs 
matched the 
19 description r uspect vehicle. 
2 0 v • AIIU wi 
2 * T4- v r» ^  p a r k e d in • - - - -• n ---* |
 p 1 :]l e first 
2 2 £ U 1 -1 ' l ' * ^ r- H rw P n i 
q
~ upon seeing 
24 that vehicle? 
2 1 i. I r a d i o e tl i. 11 I t > | I 1 il 1111 - j y e d I 
6 
what I 
in. I 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
pulled 
A. 
saw. He was directly behind me. We pulled 
pulled in right behind the vehicle. 
Did you have lights flashing or anything? 
No. 
All right. What did you do when you 
in behind them? 
As I was pulling in behind them I observed 
the driver making furtive movements with his left 
hand. It looked as though he was doing something 
with his left hand at the bottom of his seat. 
Q. 
A. 
out and 
Q. 
about? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
object/ 
area. 
Q. 
point? 
A. 
Q. 
So what did you do? 
I stopped my vehicle. An individual got 
walked around the car and — 
Was that the driver that you're talking 
Yes. 
All right. Go on. 
I observed him throw something, a metallic 
about 13 or 14 feet away into a wooded 
And how far were you from him at that 
I was approximately 25 feet away. 
Okay. So what did you do after you saw 
him throw the metallic object? 
Il 
'• 1 C» I"» i H "i '"' < » u :; I a i I I i > 1 i" i i I r .1 n " I li i m . | 111 1"" i" 11 < » 1 
2 draw > o t, 11 e y e s d w i:i y from III e s c e n e after y o u saw 
3 this perso1 * *• - this item? 
4 P li 1 111 f II IT' cm 1 the i 1 ei in li 
5 C words, you stated the person got 
7 A No. 
'•'•BI' 0 oI«,iy I 'in • nrry. After the person threw 
y L I it111 i l l 1 111 Illlii i l . h e y (Jo - - t h a t p e r s o n d o ? 
10 After threw the item Deputy Curtis 
12 would you say the person you saw throw 
13 the item was the same person that Deputy 
14 approached? 
15 p a 11 Il I" > e l i e v e s o ( i n a u d i b l e ) . 
3 von stated tha^ i was 
actually Deputy Curtis that went out 
? 
19 ,1 ! Uh-huh. 
2 0 Q. ^ tated that while he was looking 
you were observing what Deputy Curtis was doing. 
2 2| I ! Il" 
;:;) i i. II i 
'"hrown the item, at this time? 
~~r--j JurLiL. handcuffed him. 
18 
Q. When Deputy Curtis located this item and 
brought it back, did either you or Deputy Curtis 
confront him with the item and ask him if it was 
his or if he'd thrown it? 
A. I believe Deputy Curtis did. 
Q. And do you recall what the response that 
this person might have given? 
A. I can't testify. I didn't hear what his 
response was. 
Q. Okay. Now, you testified that at some 
point in time you asked the passengers to place 
their hands where you could see them. 
A. That's correct. 
Q. At what point in time did you decide it 
was appropriate to have them exit the vehicle? 
A. When I saw the open container of alcohol. 
Q. Okay, and as he exited the vehicle did you 
do the Terry frisk of those individuals? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And did Deputy Curtis help you do this or 
were you acting alone in searching the individuals? 
A. I don't recall. I believe he assisted. I 
can't remember. 
Q. Did you locate any items of paraphernalia 
or weapons on any of these individuals? 
x^ 
1 A, I 
2] Q. And you stated toe i*"em which you believed 
tw ~w alcoholic beverage was ±u ^xx^ wd^A seat. 
41 A. L 
5| C before you asked the 
:ii t: was open? 
£ could. 
C individuals exited did you 
double-check if that indeed was an alcoholic 
A 
AI1U U 
ve stated that you began %.u 
ictually what happened was when 
inside the vehicle i smelled the strong odor ol 
marijuana. After thau x proceeded with the search. 
2 ()] :aj When ynv proceeded +-o search what 
exactly were yo\ i 11 ooking for, _,^ u you know, or did 
] :: i i h e = c , :: • = :ii : tc :ii i i 
I ! I was looking tor marijuana, further opei i 
containers. 
2 0 
Q. Did you ask permission of any of the 
people there whether you could search the vehicle? 
A. 
Q. 
I don't recall. I don't believe so. 
You stated that in searching the vehicle 
you began to focus on what you label as a pocket on 
the driver's door; is that right? 
A. 
Q. 
located 
A. 
Zig-Zag 
smoking 
Q. 
you labe 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
for, but 
and they 
Q. 
of paper 
A. 
Q. 
unrolled 
A. 
That's correct. 
And within that pocket you stated you 
-- you called it a Camel buck. 
Yeah, I believe first I found a pack of 
papers, rolling papers commonly used for 
marijuana. 
Okay, but in addition you found something 
led a Camel buck; is that right? 
That's correct. 
Okay. What is a Camel buck? 
A Camel buck is -- I'm not sure what it's 
it comes on the back of Camel cigarettes 
have some kind of monetary value. 
Okay. So in other words it's some piece 
that's associated with the Camel brand? 
Right, a rectangular piece of paper. 
Okay, and when you found that item you 
it or was it folded up or how was it? 
It was folded up with something inside. 
1 Q. c 
2 unfolded 4. « . iuu;.a wnat y-~ - believed he a 
2. white powder rubstarrp * 
4 A . I > - r o c .ike 
5 substance that elieved methamphetamine. 
6 Q. A 
71 tested. 
81 A T h a t ' s c o r r e c t . 
9\ :' Q I !l i i I tl: L<: ,. I: 3 t l le i tern t h a t you ' ve i nd I c a t e d 
10 i s c u r r e n t l y a t: the J ab 
I Il A Tha !!:: • s ::: ::: r i: ec t . . . ; , 
12 Q1. Dii d y o m it, < * \ > e:i : confront either Mr. Peterson 
13 anyone else a t t:he scene a 
14 that item was (inaudible) either the Camel buck or 
15 the item found within the Camel buck? 
A individuals Ill""IIIiw 1 1 
1 7 response Blake Petersoii s response was that _^ 
19 U1 «lii in essence no one at the scene admitted 
20 that the item was theirs. 
2 3 .'...• il1 ! ! 1" '. , 
2 2 :•:. Q N : "w d :i ci y oi i e v em : state f o Mr, Peterson 
2 ' 1 l = i i ] • :: ' i i. i • = i i t: " i ]:: • t : It l • = in : = in, i 1 I < ' ' mi 1111 i n q i 11 I II i 
2 4 a r e a ? 
25 . . e c a l l . 
22 
Q. Did you ever confront either Mr* Peterson 
or anyone else in the car about the Zig-Zag papers 
that you had found? 
A. Again, I don't recall if I confronted them 
anyone about them. 
Q. Did anyone who was present at the scene, 
did either Mr. Peterson or anyone else admit to 
drug usage or drug possession at the time? 
A. Yes, one of the individuals admitted to 
smoking some marijuana. If you'd like I can read 
that. 
Q. If you'll just state the individual's 
name, if you can find it. 
A. I have here that Jeffrey admitted that 
they had been smoking marijuana. 
Q. Did anyone else? 
A. I don't believe so. 
Q. Did Mr. Peterson make any statements 
regarding either drug usage or possession while you 
were there at the scene? 
A. I believe all of his statements were that 
he had not used any drugs and that he was not in 
possession of any. 
Q. And all of these statements were made 
after he'd already been handcuffed by Deputy 
Cur Lis? 
21 A. Yes. 
3 . Q. And had either you Deputy Curtis 
I 
5 A. I did not advise him : > F h i s rights. I 
6 don u MIUW ii Deputy Curtis did. 
71 Q. Did you ever fingerprint the item which 
8 you' •< described ,„ - pipe that's here today -.. 
10 I under order was fingerprinted. 
Ill 
12 
13 Q1 As t o t h e d i s p o s i t i o n o f ' t i i e i n d i v i d u a l s , 
14 r r e s t e d ? 
15 £ 
I C 
; n a m e o f B r a d t h e r e ? 
1 8 ,. •• A. B r a d ? I b e l i e v e > ; Ye a I  i, I ' Il P e t i t 1 i " 
19 Q O k a y . Was he a r r e s t e d ? 
2 0| ••* - *c t a k e n i n t o c u s t o d y a n d t h e n t u r n e d 
22 L- t h e r e i z . v i d u a l 
l a m e d ; 
f o u n d 
2 51 e c a l l I * d h a v e L u - - I Ion Il, 
24 
believe — I think Deputy Curtis searched Brad. 
Q. Did he hr /e a valid driver's license? 
A. I don't recall. 
Q. Is there a reason why you didn't allow 
Brad to drive the car and take it home, as opposed 
to arresting him? 
A. Brad was charged. He was not just taken 
into custody and then turned over to his parents. 
He was being charged. Our option was to take him 
to juvenile detention, cite and release him or call 
his parents and leave him in their custody. We 
opted to take him and leave him in his parents' 
custody. 
Q. What was it you were going to charge him 
with? 
A. Possession of paraphernalia, (inaudible) 
an open container. 
Q. But you stated that he didn't have any 
paraphernalia on him. 
A. I didn't state that. I said --
Q. Oh, that's correct. You stated that 
Deputy Curtis (inaudible). Which paraphernalia 
item were you alleging that was involved with him? 
A. Well, possibly the paraphernalia that 
Mr. Peterson threw — Blake Peterson threw. 
Q . £ i in 1
 | i i f ( 1 i 1 i i '"I i * 
havirr it cowed? 
3 A. An inventory v^s done. 
4 Q . c ^nv other items that were 
alleged cither contraband paraphernalia 
7 A. Not cnowledge. 
8 Q. Did you take any written statements irom 
<5l a n v o * .,
 ( . viduals present at the time? 
10 / 
: : c 
12 recorder in your car time? 
13 A . 
14 o Deputy Curtis? 
15 
k n o w wa R o n «J I L11 ti i1m e ? 
18| i 
19 it an audio recorder or a video recorder? 
2 0 A . IH, ni 1 llhi . • ,. ' • 
MH„ .JEWELL: I d o n ' t h a v e a n y fur t h e r 
22 questions of this witness, your Honor. 
! 
T'U 'I'M I i .< | i , I > 
MS. LAYCOCK: Yes. 
2 6 
BY MS, 
Q. 
(inaudi 
right b 
A. 
Q. 
exit. 
A. 
He was 
in. I 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
LAYCOCK: 
When you pulled into what you call the 
ble) I believe you indicated that 
ehind the defendant's car. 
That's correct. 
All right, and that you were bl 
There's only one way in and one 
parked in the middle of the road 
pulled in directly behind him. 
Okay. Where did that road go? 
It just goes to a little campin 
Is this a legal camping spot? 
I believe so. 
So is pulling in behind him the 
that you could get close to him? 
A. 
nothing 
Yes. 
MS. LAYCOCK: Okay, thank you. 
further. 
THE COURT: Anything else? 
MR. JEWELL: No, your Honor. 
THE COURT: You may step down. 
witnesses for the State? 
MS. LAYCOCK: No, we'd rest. 
you were 
ocking an 
way out. 
on the way 
g spot. 
only way 
I have 
Any other 
r
 y itnesses for t he defense? 
:,•:-. MR. JEWELL: No, youi Honor, unless Deputy 
Curtis has arrived. 
THE COURT: Any argument, Counsel? 
5 MS. LAYCOCK: No, your Honor. 
6 a in 
7 MR. JEWEL!" : State's burden, 
8 they're not goin^ 
9 THE COURT: All right lurpose of this 
10 hearing Court finds there's probable cause LO 
II Ill 1 : >e 1 :ii • = = thc > t: th = ::::>ffenses as charged have been 
12 committed and that this defendant committed those 
13 charges. 
14 State's Exhibi' " ~ assume there's 
15 objection * being withdrawn *. 
16 MR. JEWELL your donor. 
I THE COURT: ? r ^ r- tzhdrawn. Is the 
this time 
19 MR. JEWELL oner, actually thir 
2 0 Kf Bainum's 
^ However, Mr. Bainum probablv nas to set the 
22 :ria *iar* - * at Court prefers, we can just 
entry n plea later date. 
THE COURT: Okay. We'll ne-i to * Luc 
25 ... . . ~~Lofcer with *,..- I.» « > • LLe matter, 
28 
then, for arraignment for the 4th of October at 
8 a.m. Defendant is ordered to be present at that 
time. 
(Hearing concluded) 
' " . I ' 1 SMf I'URC 1 
*511 The state suggests that an otherwise 
innocuous object, i.e., a roll of paper towels, 
becomes "clearly incriminating" by virtue of an act 
of concealment or "furtive movement." Such 
movements are certainly relevant in establishing 
probable cause to associate an object with criminal 
activity. See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 
66-67, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 1904-05, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 
(1968) ("[Deliberately furtive actions and flight at 
the approach of strangers or law officers are strong 
indicia of mens rea, and when coupled with specific 
knowledge on the part of the officer relating the 
suspect to the evidence of crime, they are proper 
factors to be considered in the decision to make an 
arrest."). Following Sibron, other jurisdictions have 
held that furtive movements or gestures alone are 
insufficient to constitute probable cause for search or 
arrest. See, e.g., State v. Sabartinelli, 23 Ariz.App. 
436, 533 P.2d 1173, 1177 (1975); People v. Cassel, 
23 Cal.App.3d 715, 100 Cal.Rptr. 520, 523 (1972); 
People v. Goessl, 186 Colo. 208, 526 P.2d 664, 665 
(1974); People v. Collins, 53 111.App.3d 253, 11 
Ill.Dec. 399, 401, 368 N.E.2d 1007, 1009 (1977); 
Commonwealth v. Concepcion, 10 Mass. App.Ct. 
613, 411 N.E.2d 477, 480 n. 2 (1980); People v. 
Robinson, 71 Mich.App. 287, 248 N.W.2d 237, 238 
(1976); State v. Braxton, 90 N.C.App. 204, 368 
S.E.2d 56, 58 (1988); State v. Bobo, 37 Ohio St.3d 
177, 524 N.E.2d 489, 492 (1988),cm. denied, 488 
U.S. 910, 109 S.Ct. 264, 102 L.Ed.2d 252 (1988); 
State v. Flores, 58 Or.App. 437, 648 P.2d 1328, 
1330 (1982); Smith v. State, 542 S.W.2d 420, 422 
(Tex. Crim. App. 1976). See generally Annotation, 
Search & Seizure: "Furtive" Movement or Gesture 
as Justifying Police Search, 45 A.L.R.3d 581 (1972) 
The rationale behind this rule is articulated by the 
court in People v. Superior Court of Yolo County 3 
Cal.3d 807, 91 Cal.Rptr. 729, 478 P.2d 449 (1970): 
[F]rom the viewpoint of the observer, an innocent 
gesture can often be mistaken for a guilty 
movement. He must not only perceive the gesture 
accurately, he must also interpret it in accordance 
with the actor's true intent. But if words are not 
infrequently ambiguous, gestures are even more 
so. Many are wholly nonspecific, and can be 
assigned a meaning only in their context. Yet the 
observer may view that context quite otherwise 
from the actor: not only is his vantage point 
different, he may even have approached the scene 
with a preconceived notion-consciously or 
subconsciously-of what gestures he expected to 
see and what he expected them to mean. The 
potential for misunderstanding in such a situation is 
obvious. 
91 Cal.Rptr. at 735, 478 P.2d at 455. Thus, other 
factors must be shown which, in the totality of the 
circumstances, would lead a reasonable and prudent 
person to believe that there is evidence of criminal 
activity. 
[8] All we have in this case is defendant's attempt 
to stuff the roll of paper towels down between the 
car seat and the console. (FN5) There is nothing 
else to suggest that the item was associated with 
criminal activity, not even a subtle connection 
between the item and the suspected prostitution deal. 
We hold that the furtive movement *512. standing 
alone, was insufficient to establish the requisite 
probable cause to make the roll of paper towels 
"clearly incriminating." Since neither the plain 
view exception nor any other exception is available 
to justify the officer's search, the search is 
unreasonable per se. (FN6) Any evidence 
subsequently seized was inadmissible as a derivative 
of that illegal search and may not be used against 
defendant. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 
471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963; State v. 
Harris, 671 P.2d 175, 181 (Utah 1983). 
We conclude that the trial court erred in denying 
defendant's motion to suppress. Defendant's 
conviction for attempted possession of a controlled 
substance is reversed, and the case is remanded to 
the trial court for such further proceedings as may 
be appropriate. 
GREEN WOO!), J., concurs. 
BILLINGS, J., concurs in the result. 
FN1. Defendant urges us to impose a more rigorous 
test under article I, section 14 of the Utah 
Constitution to determine what constitutes 
reasonable suspicion. However, she offers no 
justification for doing so. This is an insufficient 
basis for us to analyze state constitutional issues 
and we decline to do so See State v. Arroyo, 770 
P.2d 153, 154 n. 1 (Utah App. 1989). Our analysis 
is thus limited to the protections afforded under the 
fourth and fourteenth amendments to the United 
States Constitution. 
MN2. In addition to the factors listed by defendant, 
the state also asserts three other factors justifying 
the motor vehicle stop: "defendant looking back 
toward traffic;" "defendant's actions fit the 
Copyright (c) West Group 1998 No claim to original U.S. Govt, works 
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normal scenario of prostitutes on State Street;" 
and "[the officer's] experience in vice 
enforcement" 
FN3. We decline, however, to expand the pretextual 
traffic stop analysis c Sierra to the facts of this 
case. 
FN4. "Distinctive configuration" is a variation of the 
plain view exception providing that certain 
containers "cannot support any reasonable 
expectation of privacy because their contents can 
be inferred from their outward appearance." Cole, 
674 P.2d at 124 (quoting Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 
U.S. 753, 764 n. 13, 99 S.Ct. 2586, 2593 0 13, 
61 L.Ed.2d 235 (1979)). 
FN5. When the arresting officer asked defendant for 
the roll of paper towels, she denied it was hers. 
The state points out that if defendant's disclaimer 
of ownership were truly credible, she would have 
no legitimate expectation of privacy in the roll of 
paper towels and thus no standing to contest the 
validity of the search. See, e.g., Rakas v. Illinois, 
439 U.S. 128, 99 S.Ct. 421, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 
(1978); State v. Void 689 P.2d 1334 (Utah 
1984); State v. Laroc 742 P.2d 89 (Utah 
App.1987). In making its ruling on the evidence, 
the trial court here necessarily determined that 
standing was not at issue. We note that a mere 
disclaimer of ownership in the context of a police 
query is insufficient in itself to make such an 
assertion. Accord State v. Al 93 Wash.2d 
170, 606 P.2d 1235, 1236 (1980) (since the 
evidence was found on defendant's person and was 
to be used against him, there was no question that 
defendant had standing to contest the search). 
FN6. In view of our holding on probable cause 
under the clearly incriminating prong of the plain 
view exception, we need not examine the search 
under the "automobile exception" established in 
Carroll v. United States 267 U.S. 132, 45 S.Ct. 
280, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925) Carroll held "a search 
warrant unnecessary where there is probable cause 
to search an automobile stopped on the highway; 
the car is movable, the occupants are alerted, and 
the car's contents may never be found again if a 
warrant must be obtained. Hence an immediate 
search is constitutionally permissible." Chambers 
v. Maroney 399 U.S. 42, 51, 90 S.Ct. 1975, 
1981, 26 L.Ed.2d 419 (1970). See also California 
v. Carney All U.S. 386, 105 S.Ct. 2066, 85 
L.Ed.2d 406 (1985) (warrantless search of vehicle 
justified where there is probable cause, vehicle is 
mobile, and there is a reduced expectation of 
privacy); United States v. Rot 456 U.S. 798, 
102 S.Ct. 2157, 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982) (police 
having probable cause to conduct warrantless 
search of a vehicle may search any container inside 
which may conceal object of searcl State v. 
Limb, 581 P 2d 142, 144 (Utah 1978). 
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